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ABSTRACT 
China has the largest urban public transport sector in the world. In principle, strategic 
policy is determined by the central government, and passed down through the organs of 
state for implementation. In recent years that strategy has included giving priority to 
public transport and reforming the supply arrangements to secure a more commercial 
and competitive sector.  
 
In practice, responsibility for implementation is completely decentralized, with 
municipalities having both complete responsibility for financing urban public transport 
and substantial freedom to interpret central government guidance at the local level. 
This paper considers the reforms that have already occurred under this regime, the 
constraints and limitations on the reform process, and the most recent initiatives being 
undertaken.  It shows that a very wide range of systems are being experimented with 
simultaneously, with so far no sign that central government would intervene in detail or 
to provide central government finance specifically for the sector. 
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THE CHINESE CONTEXT 
China is huge. A population estimated at 1.34 billion, including a workforce of 807 
million, lives in an area of 9.6 million square kilometers. While, due to the one child 
policy, the population growth rate is only 0.66% per annum, the population is rapidly 
aging 43% of the population is already urbanized, and this rate is growing at 2.7% per 
annum.  
With an estimated average income per capita of $2,300 in 2007China has already 
reached the stage of explosive growth in car ownership. By the end of 2007, there were 
in total 56.97 million cars motorized vehicles on Chinese roads, including 14.68 million 
three-wheeled vehicles and 35.34 million privately owned vehicles with the rest 
consisting of  government and company cars. China is already the fourth largest car 
producer in the world, with vehicle sales expected to top 10 million vehicles per year by 
2010.  
Despite this growth, the private car ownership rate is still only 0.027 per capita, and the 
majority of the population is captive to non-motorized transport or public transport.  
Average bicycle ownership is still well over one per household, and there is a growing 
market for electric bicycles. But the recent priority of the Chinese central government  
has been for public transport, certainly in the large and congested cities. It is estimated 
that there are currently 1.3 million buses on Chinese roads, and that number looks likely 
to increase. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE. 
There are four levels of government in China.  Below the central government, there are 
a number of provinces, five minority autonomous regions, four municipalities with the 
provincial level standing, and two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and 
Macao). The next level includes municipalities and rural counties.  The lowest level 
comprises villages.    
 
The government structure includes the State Council and ministries at the central level, 
provincial governments and municipal governments at the local levels.  The People’s 
Congress at each level provides oversight to the government at that level, sets local 
laws, and monitors the policy implementation.  The election process at all levels is 
indirect, with representatives to the People’s Congresses elected by the population, and 
those representatives then electing the holders of the various local government positions 
(provincial governors and municipal mayors). The objectives with which each level of 
local government is concerned are passed down to them from the next level up, and 
those objectives are ultimately the expression of the goals of the Standing Committee of 
the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (the top organ of the central 
government). The cadre which administers this system, including local government, (the 
equivalent of a western civil service) are chosen and managed by CCP committees, 
although the cadres are not necessarily CCP members. At the local level the highest 
ranking cadre is the City Secretary to whom the Mayor answers. In this way the CCP 
effectively has the mechanisms to control those decisions felt to be critical 
 
Central government has the formal power to set urban transport policy and technical 
guidelines. However, not until the promulgation of   State Council’s Opinion No 46 in 
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2005 did central government body publish a policy document for urban transport, albeit 
in rather general terms.  This happened because urban transport under the increasing 
pressure of motorization and urbanization was seriously worsening national level issues 
in land, energy, and environment.  However, implementation of urban transport 
remained everywhere the responsibility of the local government. 
 
Central government also determines which agency will have responsibility for urban 
transport at lower levels of the government.   The decision in 2008 that urban public 
transport shall be the responsibility of Departments of Communication, rather than 
Construction Committees, standardizes its location for all levels of government, but 
creates some new anomalies as the policies, particularly with respect to fares and 
subsidy levels have historically differed particularly between provinces and 
municipalities. 
 
The significance of this is that while policy directives come from the highest level of 
government it is left to the lower levels to interpret those directives and to mobilize and 
manage resources in support of the strategies adopted. In practice the range of 
interpretation of national policy has been very wide indeed. 
 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
Despite this strong centralizing potential each level of local government is also, 
politically, a complete and self contained entity, able, in important ways to act outside 
the constraints and priorities of the higher levels.  This is no accident. The economic 
reforms instituted by the CCP from the late seventies included devolution of greater 
freedom and power over local economic activity to local government, associated with a 
decline in state revenues from 36% of GDP in 1978 to only 14.2% at the end of the 
millennium. (Saich, 2001) This reflects not so much a decline in the extractive capacity 
of the state but rather a re-alignment between the Centre and the localities with the 
localities controlling far greater amounts of revenue than previously. The structure of 
the fiscal contracting system that was institutionalized in 1994 transformed a province-
collecting, centre-spending fiscal regime to an essentially self-financing regime for both 
the Centre and the provinces. 
Government revenue in China is comprised of two major components: the unitary budget 
and the extra-budgetary funds (EBF) for both the central and the local governments. The 
first consists of taxes, fees and revenues collected by state financial offices and subject to 
formal budgeting by the Centre. Local levels of government in China also receive an 
allotted portion of the central government consolidated budget. The EBF cover 
officially sanctioned charges such as surcharges from taxes and public utilities, road 
maintenance fees and incomes from enterprises run by various administrative agencies. 
The EBF, while reported to higher administrative levels, are only subject to control and 
oversight by the local authorities (county or township). 
This structure has significant consequences for the local government. Naturally the local 
government units prefer to raise money in EBFs. One way of doing this is through 
extending the activities of municipal trading companies, which leads to the 
transportation companies often being conglomerates with a range of non-transport 
activities to supplement their transport work. It has led to a rise in the power of the 
regions, and as regions compete with each other for business has tended to increase 
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regional inequality as an unintended consequence of the general economic reform 
strategy.  
THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM IN CHINA 
Historically, China’s urban public transport sector was characterized by state-owned 
monopoly operators, providing regular bus services with simple fare structures.  These 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibited labour intensive operations, low-tech 
management and simple operating methods, reflecting the use of planning targets rather 
than efficiency benchmarks for staff scheduling, capital planning and operations. Input 
costs were regulated under the planned economy. Ridership was stable, or growing 
slowly Other than fare revenue, municipal budgets were the only source of financing for 
public transport, and large subsidies were needed for both capital and operating 
expenses. Until the mid eighties traditional bus operators traditional public bus 
operators held a steady 25% - 35% share of trips in major Chinese cities. 
 
In the mid-1980s, after the beginning of the national economic reforms, the bus sector 
began losing shares to non-traditional operators and other modes. Increased public 
investment between 1985 and 1994 improved the bus network and even temporarily 
increased mode share in some cities such as Guangzhou and Hangzhou.  More 
generally, public transport lost mode share due to the combined effects of increased 
motorization, congestion and increased operating costs  Only by a major process of 
reform could these trends be reversed. The subsequent history of public transport reform 
can be divided into three stages (Gwilliam, 2007).   
 
Phase 1 - Improving efficiency of the SOEs 
The first stage of reform lasted through the 1980’s and the first half of 1990s.  The 
reform focus was on how to make the state owned public transport enterprises more 
efficient to meet the increasing demand.  With the initial liberalization of the economy, 
the urban sector grew and population increased fast.  However, municipal governments 
had little resources to sustain the operations of the PT SOEs and finance the needed 
capital investment.  As part of  a  strategy to improve economic efficiency in ways 
compatible with the socialist market economic system the Chinese Government 
required  public utilities enterprises, such as those in public transport,  to commercialize 
their operations.  As a consequence, a number of reforms were introduced. 
 
First there were a set of measures to reduce labor inefficiency and redundancy, 
including:  
 
• Spinning off  excess staff to “tertiary enterprises”,  in the hopes that these would 
generate supplemental income for unprofitable bus operations.   
• Moving to one man operation, which reduces labor costs, but given the lack of 
modern fare collection equipment, also  reduces average speeds.  
• Changing employment conditions  by recruiting staff on  1-3 year basis 
(Urumqi);, converting staff to suppliers of (mostly mini-bus) services under 
contract; or introducing skill and performance based wage schemes (Tianjin)  
• Reducing other variable cost items, such as lowering fuel quality and deferring 
maintenance.  
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As a result of these actions, operating efficiencies are much improved. For example, 
staff  to bus ratios were reduced from 10:1 to near or below 5:1 in some cities.  
 
Second, commercialization included actions on pricing and marketing of services, 
such as:  
 
• Development of differentiated services, including  premium services and 
minibus services with matching fare structures.  
• Real fare increases, which were introduced in some cities with only limited 
success as emerging competition from minibus and other premium services 
presented an upper-bound on sustainable fare increases. 
• Abolition of reduced rate fares, which was adopted as an alternative to general 
fare increases in some cities.  For example, monthly passes, which allowed 
unlimited travel for a fixed monthly charge, were abandoned in Shanghai in 
1995, with disastrous impacts on ridership. 
• Changes in fare structures. Both flat fares and distance based fares have been 
used, but no city appears to have used any zonal or time based fare system. 
• Smart cards, which are being introduced in a number of cities.   
 
Phase 2 - Reforming industry structure 
The second stage of reform(second half of 1990s until 2005) focused more on PT 
industry structure, and contained two major sets of measures.   
 
First, several internal structural reforms were adopted in the SOEs, as a consequence 
of which many municipal bus companies are now corporatized, and  behave in an 
increasingly commercialized manner. These measures included:  
• Divisionalization of the SOES has been introduced to enable comparisons to be 
made between operating efficiency of the units in several cities, led by 
Shanghai. (see Box 1)   
• Creation of second tier companies with independent legal entity status (e.g. 
Tianjin). Sometimes this has been associated with the introduction of a system 
of differential payments to staff  of the subsidiary companies based on the 
company performance (e.g. Chengdu) 
• Inward investment has been utilized in a number of cities - e.g. Guangzhou, 
Xian - where external entities take a shareholding in the SOEs (more typically in 
the subsidiary layer than in the parent company.  In practice, corporate policy 
and control remains with the state sector  
• Introducing contractual relationships between subsidiaries and parent 
companies with incentives for good performance (as in Chongqing) 
• Functional separation has also occurred with separate companies established for 
maintenance and bus station operations (as in Tianjin) 
• Sub-contracting to private companies and other arrangements through which 
private companies participate in supply. In Qingdao a subsidiary company has 
been established as an equity joint venture with public transport companies in 
Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Nanning 
(Gwilliam,Zhi and Finn) 6 
These initiatives have met with varied success. The most ambitious, the attempt to 
completely commercialize public bus transport in Shanghai, is widely regarded by other 
cities as a failure, demonstrating the inappropriateness of attempting to rely on 
commercial principles as the basis for the provision of public transport services. What it 
certainly did show was that the particular form of commercialization adopted – 
effectively total commercial freedom for company management – must be 
supplemented and supported by some public involvement in managing the regime if 
some non-commercial social objectives are also sought.   Unfortunately, the fact that 
such objectives can be achieved by appropriate design of a franchising system appears 
to have been lost sight of, and many cities have been discouraged from any departure 
from more traditional supply structures as a consequence. 
 
 
 
Second, a number of cities have taken steps  to open market access to new entrants, 
both private and public, domestic and foreign. The main ways in which this has 
occurred include the following. 
 
• Establishment of new public transport enterprises. In recent years, some foreign 
and domestic investment companies have established new public transport 
enterprises to compete in the newly emerging public transport market.   
• Establishment of Joint Ventures between the SOE and private investors (e.g. 
Beijing, Tianjin). These are usually small in terms of market share and find it 
difficult to grow since they do not have access to the same support finance as 
SOEs. 
• Contracted operations by private individuals.  This is common in newly-
emerging small cities and it in some large and medium-sized cities on some 
remote lines, though it is tending to reduce again in the larger cities. 
• Franchising lines. For example, Guangzhou introduced a comprehensive 
competitively tendered franchising system (see Box 2) 
• Auctioning lines.  More recently, some newly opened lines have been auctioned 
as commodities to be exploited without specific controls  
Box 1. Restructuring Shanghai Public transport: 
 
 In 1996, Shanghai disbanded the Public Transport General Company.  All sub-companies 
became financially independent from the government.  Since then, the sector attracted foreign 
investment, private participation, and even capital raised from stock market (through PT 
companies listed in the stock exchange).  With the deepening of commercialization and 
intensification of market competition, the good markets were crowded with supplies while the 
thin markets were not well served.  That left the social objective of PT under-achieved.  The 
market competition was recently seriously affected by high fuel prices, high labor costs, and 
the expansion of government financed metro system.  When fare subsidies were considered 
necessary, the government found difficult to determine the level of subsidies to each of PT 
firms due to the location-specific factors of the markets where they operate.  The government 
also found difficult to provide PT services to the newly developed sections of the city as the 
markets there were not matured and tested.  All these difficulties drove the city to move to 
emphasize the role of the government and the importance of achieving social objectives.  The 
scheme being consider is one that every sub-market of the city should be served mainly by a 
state-owned PT company, to ensure the basic services at affordable fares are provided.  The 
privately owned companies that control the PT assets are expected to sell the PT assets back to 
the government owned PT companies.       
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A National Platform for Reform 
The first two stages of reform, though in some cases substantial, were driven as much 
by the need to husband resources better at the provincial and municipal level as more 
financial responsibility was passed down to them as by any principled commitment to 
reform of the transport sector per se. The reforms were heterogeneous, and not always 
successful. 
 
In an attempt to secure both greater consistency and greater commitment to reform the 
Central Government has issued three major policy documents since 2003 which are 
directly relevant to the problems of further development of the urban transport sector. 
The first relates to the context in which public transport is supplied, and recommends 
that public transport should be given priority in urban transport development.  The 
second relates specifically to the way in which the municipal public utilities operate and 
recommends the franchising of operations of municipal enterprises. The third specifies 
the means through which prioritization of public transport is to be implemented.  All 
would appear to be critical to the establishment of a reform strategy for public transport. 
The Opinion of the Ministry of Construction on the Priority Development of Urban 
Public Transport, 2003  
 
This opinion emphasizes the importance of urban public transport for the avoidance of 
traffic congestion and the improvement of the urban living environment.  It proposes a 
structured integration of transport modes in mega-cities, with rail services supplying the 
longer distance trunk services and buses and trolleybuses acting as feeders and 
supplying shorter distance movement demands. Targets are set network density, 
maximum travel times and urban public transport shares of the market. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives the opinion emphasizes the guiding role of urban 
planning.  It requires;  
 
Box 2.  Franchising public transport in Guangzhou:   
 
Guangzhou’s PT sector entered the market in 1994, when a first PT joint venture with 
foreign investment emerged to provide services.  Subsequently, the city adopted a bus 
franchising system.  Up to 2005, 14 bus companies operated in the market.  After the State 
Council Document No 46 was issued, Guangzhou took action to integrate a number of bus 
companies into three major operators.  This allowed the provision of more convenient, 
integrated services to the public and to the rapidly expanding metro system.  On this basis, a 
number of mini-bus and medium-bus services were also provided.  The government is 
currently implementing a three-year scheme of fare subsidies (approximately 20% of the 
existing fares).  It is uncertain how much the government could subsidize afterwards.  When 
the government held a public hearing on fare subsidies in 2008, the government was 
questioned the sustainability of the fare subsidy policy. 
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• An Urban Master Plan which acts as the master plan for urban development.  
• A Comprehensive Urban Transport Plan, consistent with the  Master Plan, 
which sets the strategy for transport and ensures the allocation of appropriate 
land resources for its implementation.  
• An Urban Public Transport Plan, which defines the structure of urban road 
public transport services and facilities to achieve the objectives of the 
Comprehensive Urban Transport Plan.  
• A Rail Transport Plan for cities planning to have rail services. 
 
The people’s government in each city was required to conduct a comprehensive 
inspection of the formulation and implementation of these plans before the end of 2004. 
In terms of implementation, particular attention is to be given to the facilitating 
infrastructure, including depots, stops, public transport dedicated roads, and interchange 
hubs. This involves the development of a city wide urban public transport regulation 
and standards regime which would include supervision and enforcement of public 
transport service standards.   But it also addresses the problems of financing and 
requires the establishment of a standardized fiscal subsidy system. It requires 
collaboration between the competent construction authorities with the public finance 
and pricing authorities in each city, and specifies that any policy related losses caused 
by price restrictions should be the subject of direct subsidy. 
 
At the institutional level the opinion requires further efforts to break down monopolies, 
open up the urban transport market, and introduce a regime of urban public transport 
franchises. This would involve a deepening of the reform of the state-owned public 
transport enterprises so that the enterprises can become market players responsible for 
their own business operations and development. 
The Regulation on Administrative Methods in Franchise Operations of Municipal 
Public Utilities 
This regulation, effective from May 1, 2004, requires that the franchising of municipal 
public utilities shall comply with principles of openness, fairness, equity, and priority of 
public interest. It applies to all municipal public utility sectors, including public 
transport, if they are subject to franchise operations according to law. While in principle 
it could apply to urban public transport, it does not currently do so because no law has 
been passed requiring franchising of urban public transport services. 
 
The regulation deals with a number of procedures to satisfy these requirements: 
 
• Qualification for an enterprise to enter public utilities market. (Article 7) 
• Procedures for selection (Article 8) 
• Content of a franchise agreement (Article 9) 
• Rights and responsibilities of the authority (Articles 10 and 12) and the 
enterprise awarded the franchise (Article 11) 
• Duration of contract (Article 12) and procedures for amendment or termination 
(Articles14-19, 23) 
• Price regulation (Article 22). 
• Avoidance of illegal behavior or breach of agreement (Articles 27-30). 
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Although the regulation appears to cover most of the major issues which need to be 
addressed in franchising it does not attempt to reach the level of specification for it to be 
applied directly as a franchising system to the transport sector. As a consequence cities 
which have introduced franchising, like Guangzhou, have effectively invented their own 
rules and procedures. 
State Council Opinion 46 on Urban Transport Priority Development, October 2005 
This opinion provides extensive guidance on a wide range of measures to prioritize 
public transport, concentrating on four main issues: 
• Restructuring the investment and financing mechanisms. This was to include 
measures to encourage domestic and foreign non-state capital to participate in 
the construction and operation of public transport through joint ventures, co-
operatives or trust forms. 
• Promoting the franchise system. This was to involve opening the market to 
multiple suppliers while avoiding the unconditional  and reckless selling of  
facilities and route operating rights.  Individual routes were to be granted as 
monopoly operations to selected suppliers subject to withdrawal of those rights 
if performance was inadequate. 
• Strengthening market regulation. This required improved administrative 
regulation of the operation and service quality of public transport supply 
enterprises.  
• Upgrading the service level. This required improvements in route planning, 
vehicle quality and operations and in terminal operations. 
 
  INTERPRETING THE REFORM REQUIREMENTS 
 
The initial reactions to the reform requirements have been studied in 12 cities in China 
in a study which found that municipal progress varied considerably on the four major 
planks of the recommended development strategy. 
 
Restructuring the investment and financing mechanisms 
This is where the energy of the municipalities has been concentrated. Of the 12 Chinese 
cities studied all have either implemented changes in the ownership of their SOEs or 
have active plans to do so.  The main motivation for this appears to have been that of 
obtaining new off-budget sources of finance.  In most cases this is achieved through th 
creation of a joint stock company, or joint venture, with the inward investment 
remaining as capital within the company.  In many cases the investors are SOEs from 
other provinces, though in some cases foreign investors (e.g. from Singapore) are 
involved.  For the most part, however, the deals have been structured to avoid any 
change of effective management control.  Only in two cases, of Fuzhou and Shenyang, 
was an entity other than the municipality allowed to be the majority shareholder, though 
the deals under consideration in Urumqi and Wuhan might involve such transfer. 
Shenyang appears to have made the most dramatic reform.  All of the operating assets 
have been transferred to joint ventures with 4 main foreign investors; the SOE retains 
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the terminal facilities and the garaging facilities which it leases out to the private 
operators.  
 
Promoting franchising 
Several of the cities have combined the creation of a joint stock company with the 
award of long term franchises to the new companies.  Very lengthy franchises of up to 
30 years have been proposed in Fuzhou, Shenzhen and Xi’an. If implemented these may 
close the markets for a generation, making further reform impossible. That is clearly not 
the intention of state Council Opinion 46, which advocates other developments which 
will be pre-empted by the deals currently under development. None of the 12 cities has 
implemented an open market for the provision of transport services.  Nor have they 
developed transparent means of route award, through which operators of all forms of 
ownership might gain operating rights. Even cities like Fuzhou, which has previously 
permitted diverse forms of private participation attempts are being made to merge them 
into a few small companies in a semi closed market. Guangzhou has started competitive 
tendering of new routes, but does not appear to intend to extend it to existing routes 
Strengthening market regulation 
In principle, the SOE bus operating companies were formally units of the municipality 
whose assets were owned by the State Property Bureau and which were regulated by the 
passenger transport Management Office of the Construction or Communications 
Bureau.. In practice the PT regulatory units of the Municipality do not appear to have 
the capacity to function as transport authorities and the SOEs have been the real 
executive arm of Government for UPT, managing card schemes and dispatching 
systems and doing route planning as well as being the sole operator.  While Guangzhou 
Municipality has adopted a more positive stance in its tendering of new routes, it still 
appears to lack capabilities either for customer-facing services or for integration. One of 
the problems confronted in reforming the financing of public transport by the creation 
of joint stock companies has been that such planning and regulatory skills as exist were 
within the companies.  The temptation has therefore been to give the new companies 
very long term franchises and very substantial freedom to continue to develop the 
system as an effective monopoly. 
 
Upgrading service level 
The main ways in which concern for upgrading service level is being interpreted in the 
cities studied are through the progressive elimination of minibuses and the 
concentration of large bus activities in a few large companies, where necessary by 
amalgamation of existing small units.  Neither private sector involvement nor 
competition for franchises appear to be seen as a particularly relevant characteristic in 
this respect. 
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LIMITATIONS TO REFORM AND EMERGING PROBLEMS 
The conceptual divide  
There is a considerable gulf between the vision of a developing competitive commercial 
structure embodied in State Council Opinion 46 and the much more conservative, 
company-centred view of many municipal administrations. In many cases the municipal 
administrations do see the need for off-budget sources of finance, and hence the need 
for new structural forms of company organization (Liu Zhi and Smith,2006).  But they 
do not appear to see any alternative to a structure which bears considerable resemblance 
to the old situation where the major operator was also the planner and regulator. The 
SCO 46 exhortation to develop franchising is therefore interpreted as a transfer of 
responsibility for finance and development to companies (which in many cases remain 
dominated by municipal ownership) and not as a vehicle for the introduction of 
competitive pressures.  
The practical compromises 
Particularly where the introduction of foreign capital is involved the municipalities 
have been forced to recognize that there must be some degree of security for the 
investors, as well as some scope for profit from the investments. Long term, non-
competed franchises, with the transfer of all the rights traditionally enjoyed by the 
SOEs, offer both, and tend therefore to be the starting point for bilateral discussions 
between municipalities and private investors. Hence what appear to be emerging in a 
number of cities are deals which are actually anti-competitive and if consummated will 
close the market to reform for many years.  These compromises raise a number of other 
thrusts which appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of SCO46, including 
the transfer of rights without competitive tendering, and very long term contracts, with 
tendering limited to new routes or peripheral routes only.  
 
Some municipalities are very well aware, and somewhat wary, of this, and would like to 
avoid long term commitment to an independent entity.  Hence they often opt for joint 
ventures in which the municipality remains the dominant shareholder. For example the 
French Veolia group has established a number of joint ventures in the area around 
Nanjing in Jiangsu province. The uncertainty of the relationships with the local 
administrations renders such arrangements risky and fragile: it remains to be seen how 
well they will survive. 
Urban-suburban integration and the financing of subsidy.  
 
Current attention is focused on three related problems, namely; (a) the difference 
between arrangements for urban and suburban transport (b) the lack of financial means 
for some authorities to support the implementation of low fare policies, and, (c) 
deficiencies in subsidy administration, arising from the opaque and unfocussed system 
in which subsidies are currently determined and administered. 
The historical origin of the difference in arrangements for urban and suburban transport 
was the fact that in the municipalities’ urban transport was a responsibility of the 
department of construction while outside the municipalities it was the responsibility of 
the department of transport (communications). Moreover, the cities have usually been 
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richer than the counties and districts. The consequence of is that fares differ 
substantially between urban and suburban services within the same conurbation. For 
example a flat fare of 40 kwei (US$0.06) is charged for bus services in Beijing 
municipality, while suburban fares crossing the boundary are on a graduated scale, but 
at about ten times the Beijing fare. The recent government decision that all bus 
transport, whether urban or suburban, should be handled by the Ministry of 
Communications has created a very obvious anomaly, especially in the light of the 
unwillingness of central government to subsidize directly. 
The lack of financial means is also partly a result of the administrative differences. 
Services in the inner cities are typically provided by a state owned enterprise, often as a 
monopoly supplier, with some locally financed planned subsidy as well as the 
unplanned subsidy arising from deficit financing or cheap money available for the 
finance of accumulated deficits. Services outside the inner cities are provided by a range 
of operators, including state-owned enterprises, international joint ventures and local 
private enterprises, but are viewed as commercial activities and not consistently given 
the same favourable treatment in respect of tax and subsidy conditions. Additionally, 
however, as central government encourages priority to public transport development 
even the municipalities are arguing that they do not have the resources to finance public 
transport at fare levels substantially below those prevailing at the moment. 
The deficiencies in administration include the fact that the current true situation is 
difficult to ascertain for the municipal transport groups which publish only consolidated 
accounts at a very low level of detailed breakdown and the fact that the non-municipal 
companies obtain their subsidy through local administrations essentially through a 
continuing process of  lobbying and persuasion in the absence of any formula for its 
determination or contract between the local government and the operator on the 
conditions of its payment. The consequence is uncertainties about both the available 
level of subsidy finance and the timing of the payment of support, which in turn causes 
operators to devote excessive efforts to negotiating with the local administrators 
(creating scope for corruption) and makes commercial operators unwilling to invest in 
the absence of any security of their revenue flow. The effect of this is twofold. First the 
implementation of new standards tends to be rather haphazard and not consistently 
followed. Second, operators’ decisions on rational vehicle replacement are substantially 
distorted by the possibility that a tranche of subsidy money may become available for 
vehicle replacement. 
In the context of a commercialized (though often still publicly owned) bus undertaking 
there are already a range of specific compensation payments - for reduced and fare 
exempt passengers (usually generously calculated as the difference between the fare 
paid and the “full” fare), for government imposed services either for emergency or for 
area development reasons, and for vehicle purchase to improve vehicle quality. For the 
most part these go to the main municipal undertakings.  In addition these undertakings 
appear to receive deficit financing through preferential treatment of their debt through 
the state banking system. 
Operators outside the municipal areas, whether publicly or privately owned, are 
generally expected to be self financing. Even where they are in receipt of subsidies their 
quantity and timing tends to be arbitrary and unpredictable. 
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The implementation of a low fares policy on previously financially self-sufficient 
companies raises new challenges. It is increasingly being recognized that simple deficit 
financing has very bad incentive properties. In order to overcome this, the multi-
operator city of Shenzhen is developing a more incentive compatible system in which 
the allowed costs are not the actual costs of the company but a calculated standard costs. 
Basically the formula of the method is as follows: 
 SP   =   C    -   R   -    SS 
 Where    SP   =    General price level subsidy 
       R   =    Revenue from passengers 
       C   =    Standardized costs 
      SS   =   All other specific subsidies 
When applied in a specific administrative area like Shenzhen this approach can be used 
to inform the local administration of the fiscal implications of setting different fare 
levels. It therefore contributes to a greater degree of realism in local decision making, 
and can assist the administration in reconciling its desire for lower fares with its fiscal 
capacity.   
It has been suggested that the same approach should be used at the province or national 
level. In this context, some serious limitations of the method need to be recognized. 
First, it relies on there being sufficient similarity between the conditions of operation of 
the units between which subsidy is being distributed for the standardization of costs to 
be meaningful. If applied to conditions where this homogeneity does not exist it would 
inevitably channel subsidies predominantly to those operating in favourable 
circumstances. These might consist of high operating speeds (for example in comparing 
urban with suburban services) or low input factor prices (for example labour costs in 
comparisons between coastal and inland regions).  Hence, before the method could be 
applied as a basis for identifying the effects of fare reduction policies for subsidy by 
central government the standardization of costs would need to have been done 
satisfactorily.  
A further problem of the application of the model at the national level is that the 
calculated general fare subsidy would depend on the initial level of fare adopted.  If this 
is determined at the local level (by a local Price Bureau) there would be an incentive for 
setting of low fares as this would attract higher subsidy contributions from central 
government.  This perverse incentive would be reduced if central government were to 
limit its own commitment to some proportionate counterpart funding, based on the 
provincial or municipal funding having been calculated according to the agreed 
formula, and the calculations and data been made available to the Ministry of Finance 
and Ministry of Communications for auditing and research purposes. 
An alternative, and probably better way to control the total burden on central 
government and to maintain the incentive for operators to reduce costs, would be the 
use of a national level specification of a reference fare level on which the calculation 
should be based.  (In practice this might also be an attractive way of taking forward the 
aim of obtaining integration of urban and suburban transport fare structures).  The 
administrative mechanics and political feasibility of such a reference tariff arrangement 
would need to be explored. Most important, some detailed research would be necessary 
before the implementation of this kind of method to advise government of the likely 
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costs to the budget of setting different reference fare levels. It is recommended that 
CATS direct their research effort in the subsidy field to achieving this, rather than 
emphasizing the idea of identifying the “correct’ level of subsidy from central 
government. 
It is clear from recent discussions in Taiyuan, Wuhan and Nanjing, that there is 
considerable resistance to the provision of the necessary disaggregate financial and 
operating data.  This arises not so much from the fear of data being available to 
commercial competitors (in many cases there are none!) but from the desire to maintain 
the advantage which knowledge of the true situation gives them in negotiations with the 
political authorities.  That applies just as much to the quasi-independent Joint Venture 
companies as to the wholly state owned companies. The question of access to data 
needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency, probably at the national ministerial level.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the initial stage of reform of urban public transport in China the emphasis was very 
much on increasing the efficiency of the traditional state owned enterprises – driven 
largely by the need to limit the burden of the enterprises on the municipal and provincial 
governments. A wide range of actions were taken, with considerable success. 
 
In the second phase of reform, from the mid 1990s, the emphasis shifted to more 
fundamental restructuring of the supply arrangements. Various devices were used to 
enhance the commercialization and competitiveness of the sector, including commercial 
freedom for fragmented public enterprises, competitive franchising, and outright sale of 
service rights. The private sector, both domestic and foreign, was seen as a source of 
capital and was often involved in joint venture enterprises.    The results were very 
mixed.  Most cities saw some improvement of PT service quality.  But increased 
commercial freedom often resulted in loss of some services deemed socially desirable. 
Rarely did the new arrangements address the issue of how to reconcile the continued 
provision of unprofitable services with a market based supply arrangement. 
 
In the most recent phase, during the last four years, national government has entered the 
arena to encourage cities to give priority to public transport. State Council Opinion 46, 
2005, advocated upgrading service levels, and encouraged the expansion of foreign and 
domestic non-state finance while advocating extended franchising under strengthened 
market regulation. 
 
In practice, however, given their considerable freedom to interpret the requirements of 
SCO 46, many cities read the document primarily as a simple justification for increasing 
subsidies. Beijing was the first to implement heavy fare cuts in a hope to boost PT usage 
and restrain private cars before and during the Olympic Games, at the cost of an 
explosion in subsidy level. The apparent success of this strategy in affecting modal 
choice encouraged other cities to consider following suit. Further pressure to increase 
subsidies has resulted from the integration of urban and suburban transport under the 
same departmental responsibility, which many cities interpret as requiring suburban 
services to be provided at the same highly subsidized fares as the urban services. 
 
In practice, few cities have the financial capacity to copy Beijing, and, despite its 
advocacy of priority for public transport, national government shows little sign of being 
(Recent Developments in Urban Bus Transport in China) 15 
willing to inject substantial financial support from the center. Nor is it able to, as, since 
the economic reforms of the eighties, which significantly decentralized service 
responsibilities and financial means, its share of public tax revenues has fallen 
substantially. 
 
China’s PT sector is thus now at the cross roads. The new challenge is how to promote 
PT without eroding the hard-earned foundation for market competition, but some of the 
earlier attempts to commercialize – like that in Shanghai – have been discredited.  
Furthermore, understanding of more successful and better prepared strategies, like that 
of Guangzhou, is limited and dispersed. And, to date, the Ministry of Communications 
has not developed the means to give effective operational advice to cities on how to 
reconcile their service aspirations with their fiscal capability. 
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